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Abstract
In the context of the debate on the labour-market consequences of globalisation, we
examine worker mobility in order to identify the wage dierences between foreign and
domestic rms. Using matched employer-employee panel data for Portugal, we consider
virtually all spells of interrm mobility over a period of ten years. We nd that foreign
rms oer signicantly more generous wage policies, although there is also a (smaller)
selection eect. The results are robust to the consideration of wage growth dierences,
the case of displaced workers and dierent subsets of workers.
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11 Introduction
As globalisation evolves, there is greater interest in its labour-market implications. One
dimension of this question concerns the role of foreign rms in terms of their remuneration
of host-economy workers. While earlier cross-sectional evidence suggests that foreign rms
oer more generous pay levels than their domestic counterparts (Aitken et al. 1996, Feenstra
& Hanson 1997), some of these results have been questioned in recent research based on
longitudinal worker-level data (Martins 2004, Heyman et al. 2007, Andrews et al. 2007).1
The main problem in research about the foreign-ownership wage dierential concerns un-
observed heterogeneity across workers employed in either domestic or foreign rms. If rm
aliation is correlated with other factors that may aect wages but that are not controlled
for, then estimates will be biased. While some research aims to tackle this issue considers the
case of acquisitions (when the same workers can be observed under the two types of rms),
here we approach the unobserved heterogeneity challenge from the complementary angle of
worker mobility.
Specically, we draw upon a longitudinal census of the Portuguese labour market in order
to consider virtually all spells of interrm worker mobility over a period of ten years (1991-
2000). Such spells allow us to observe the same workers when employed by domestic and
foreign rms. We then examine the data for evidence of what we label `wage policy' and
`selection' eects. The latter eect concerns unexplained dierences in the wages of workers
that are to experience a movement to a dierent rm, before such movement occurs. These
unexplained wage dierences are likely to capture additional skills not measured in the data
but that are observable by those workers' current employers such as ability, dedication, etc.
On the other hand, the `wage policy' eect, which is perhaps more directly related to the
goal of this paper, concerns dierences in remuneration experienced by workers that engage
in interrm mobility, as they move between rms. Such dierences in remuneration practices
across rms are predicted by non-competitive models of the labour market, namely eciency
wages and search models. Moreover, those dierences are also supported by abundant empir-
ical evidence, including rent sharing, discrimination, cohort eects and other evidence of rm
heterogeneity in general (Abowd et al. 1999, Bartelsman & Doms 2000).
As far as we know, our paper is the rst to conduct a systematic analysis of interrm worker
1See Andrews et al. (2007) also for a thorough survey of the literature.
2mobility drawing on census data. These data are particularly important for our purpose as
the analysis of even large samples would dramatically diminish one's ability to follow workers
over time. More importantly, we are the rst to conduct this extensive analysis in the context
of the foreign-ownership wage dierential literature.2 Our results may also be useful in terms
of reconciling some contrasting evidence for dierent countries; and in terms of shedding light
on the role of worker mobility as a channel of productivity spillovers from foreign to domestic
rms (Fosfuri et al. 2001, Javorcik 2004).
Unlike earlier research based on acquisitions, our paper nds very strong evidence of
a sizeable, positive `wage policy' eect for foreign rms. However, `selection' eects are also
present, but at a much smaller scale. These results are robust to a number of checks, including
the consideration of the case of displaced workers and an analysis of the wage growth patterns
of movers when in hiring rms.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the data; Sections 3 and 4
present the results and the robustness analysis; nally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
This paper draws on a particularly rich annual census of all rms in Portugal that employ
at least one worker in any year - Quadros de Pessoal (Personnel Records). This census is
administered by the Ministry of Employment, which requests information about a large set
of variables concerning the rm, its establishments (if any) and also about each one of all the
rms' employees.3
Crucially for the purpose of this paper, the list of variables available in the data includes
unique identiers for both rms and employees. These variables allow us to follow workers
over time and, in particular, as they move between (foreign and domestic) rms. The set of
variables at the rm level include industry (ve digits), region (three digits), size (number of
workers), age, foreign ownership percentage, sales, and equity. Moreover, at the worker level,
the variables include education, age, gender, tenure (in months), occupation (ve digits),
wages, hours, job level (two digits) and promotions.
2See Martins & Esteves (2008) for a dierent analysis of worker interrm mobility, based on the case of
Brazil. See also Bjelland et al. (2007) for recent evidence of interrm mobility in the U.S.
3The census is designed to check compliance with employment laws. It also serves general statistical pur-
poses. Firms that do not ll in the census questionnaire correctly are subject to penalties that are perceived
to have ensured high levels of data quality.
3There are a total of ve wage variables (base pay, overtime pay, tenure-related pay, bonus,
and a residual category) and two hours variables (normal time and overtime). The hourly
wage measure we use throughout in this paper is dened as the sum of all ve wage variables
above divided by the sum of the two hours variables. This hourly wage is then de
ated using
the Consumer Price Index.
We then use the foreign ownership variable allows us to characterise rms as either foreign
or domestic owned. We dene a rm to be foreign owned when foreign investors control at
least 50% of its voting rights. 4 Moreover, while we do not have information about domestic
multinationals, we know that their number was particularly small over this period.5
While the census has been ongoing since 1982, in this paper we use data from 1991 to
2000.6 This is also a period in which FDI into the Portuguese economy grew considerably,
motivated at least in part by the accession to the European Community in 1986 - see Figure
1 for the evolution of FDI in
ows and out
ows from Portugal from 1986.
We constructed our main mobility data sets by matching each annual le of all employees
(and their rms) from 1992 to 2000 with the equivalent le for the previous year. (Each year
corresponds to a snapshot of the rms and their workers in the census month: March, up
to 1993, and October, from 1994.) Workers are matched over each pair of years based on
their personal identication number (and also using their gender and year and month of birth
variables as further checks). Moreover, by comparing the rm identier of each worker over
the two subsequent years, the worker can be classied as either a `stayer' or as a `mover'.7
Spurious movers - when the worker's rm identier is dierent between t and t+1 but the date
of entry into the rm does not change in a consistent way (for instance because of mergers or
movements across rms that belong to the same holding) - are dropped.
Moreover, as we acknowledge that many movers will not necessarily be present in the
data in the following year's census month, we also consider movers between years t and t+2.
However, this case only applies when the individual's identier is not present in the data in
4This threshold is not a necessary nor a sucient condition for a rm to be controlled by a foreign investor.
Although we believe 50% is the optimal level in terms of separating rms with a large enough foreign presence
from the remaining rms. In any case, our results are not sensitive to a denition based on a threshold of 10%
of voting rights, as the distribution of foreign voting shares indicates that the overwhelming majority of rms
with some positive level of foreign presence have a share of foreign ownership of at least 50%.
5This enables us to consider that foreign rms are virtually the same as multinational rms, sidestepping
the debate about whether it is multinationality or foreign ownership that matters (Heyman et al. 2007).
6Although it is possible to consider a longer period, worker-level data have not been made available by the
Ministry of Employment for 1990 and 2001. We therefore decided to focus on the period considered here, as
otherwise there would be time gaps in the analysis.
7See Martins (2007) for another example of worker longitudinal analysis based on the same data set.
4year t+1. In this case, the date of entry into the rm in year t+2 is required to be consistent
with some spell outside the Quadros de Pessoal data during year t + 1, which implies that
the individual was unemployed, inactive or worked outside the coverage of the data (informal
sector or public servants) in, at least, some period during year t + 1 (including that year's
census month).
Finally, we also consider all other workers that can be dened as `stayers'. These are
workers present in years t and t+1 at the same rm. However, according to our classication,
a `stayer' between years t and t + 1 can then, of course, become a `mover' between years
t+1 and t+2, for instance. The only `stayers' that we disregard are those employed in rms
involved in acquisitions over the years in which the acquisition takes place. A subset of these
workers involved in acquisitions are examined in Martins (2004).
Table 1 presents averages and standard deviations of the resulting data set, which corre-
sponds to a total of more than 10 million observations. 7.4% of all observations are movers
from domestic to another domestic rms. Movers from foreign to domestic rms are .5%
while .6% move in the opposite direction. Only .1% move between dierent foreign rms.
The remaining 91.4% of the data are `stayers'.8
Moreover, in Tables 9, 10, 11 and 12, we present additional statistics for each subsample
of movers, according to their specic path. In particular, we separately describe the workers
that move from foreign to domestic rms (about 55,000 workers), from domestic to foreign
rms (about 67,000 workers), between domestic rms (over 800,000 workers) and between
foreign rms (about 14,000 workers). Perhaps the most remarkable dierence amongst the
four groups of movers concerns their wage growth averages. They range from 22% in the
case of movers from domestic to foreign rms to -6.3% in the case of movers from foreign
to domestic rms. In the cases of movers between domestic rms or movers between foreign
rms, the average wage growth levels are similar: 6.4% and 5.8%, respectively.
This descriptive evidence suggests strongly that foreign rms do oer more generous wage
policies. The following Sections will examine this preliminary result in more detail.
8Amongst other results, almost 40% of all workers are female, the average tenure is 8.7 years, and 7.8% of
workers are employed by foreign rms. The average net job creation rate (weighted by rm size) is 3.7%. (The
net job creation rate is dened as NJC =
Lt Lt 1
0:5(Lt+Lt 1), in which Lt denotes the number of workers in period
t (Davis et al. 1996).)
53 Results
3.1 Wage levels
Following from the discussion in the Introduction, the main equation we consider in our
empirical analysis is:
wit = 1FDit + 2DFit + 3DDit + 4FFit + X0
it5 + F0
it6 + 
t + it; (1)
in which wit represents the logarithm of the average real wage of worker i in year t, X are
worker controls (schooling, quadratics in tenure and experience, and gender), F are rm
controls concerning the characteristics of the rm that employs worker i in year t (log rm
size - measured by the number of workers, industry and region dummies, and a foreign-rm
dummy), and 
t are year xed eects. DFit is a dummy variable taking value one if a worker
is employed by a domestic rm in year t (and in year t's job spell)9 and will in the following
job spell be employed by a foreign rm. Similarly, FDit is a dummy variable taking value one
if a worker is employed by a foreign rm in year t (and in year t's job job spell) and will in





1; if Foris = 1 and Fori;s+1 = 0
0; if Foris = 0 or Fori;s+1 = 1;
(2)
in which s denotes the spell of employment of the individual.10 Similarly, we have for the





1; if Foris = 0 and Fori;s+1 = 1






1; if Foris = 0 and Fori;s+1 = 0
0; if Foris = 0 or Fori;s+1 = 0;
(4)
9A job spell is dened here as a set of all years in which a worker is continuously employed by the same
rm.
10We do not need to impose extra conditions such as is 6= i;s 1, in which is denotes the rm employing
worker i in spell s, when FDis = 1, indicating that the worker moves to a dierent rm, as we have ruled out






1; if Foris = 1 and Fori;s+1 = 1
0; if Foris = 1 or Fori;s+1 = 1:
(5)
Given the motivation of this paper, 1 and 2 are the main parameters of interest. Their
coecients indicate the average dierence in wages for workers that subsequently move from
foreign to domestic rms or from domestic to foreign rms, respectively, in comparison to
workers that stay in the same rm. Moreover, 3 and 4 indicate the average dierence in
wages for workers that move from a domestic rm to another domestic rm or from a foreign
rm to another foreign rm, respectively, before they move.
The rst column of Table 2 presents the results for the estimation of equation (1). We
nd that foreign rms pay on average about 13.6% more, a result consistent with those from
other countries when using similar specications. More importantly, we nd that workers in
domestic rms that will have a subsequent spell at a foreign rm are already paid (2.3%)
more before they move. There is also evidence that workers in foreign rms whose subsequent
employment spell is at another foreign rm are already paid substantially more (about 7.1%
more) than similar workers in foreign rms but that will stay on in their current rm. On
the other hand, workers that are employed in foreign rms but that are, in subsequent years,
employed at domestic rms do not earn a signicantly dierent wage than those that stay in
their current rm. Finally, workers that move from a domestic rm to another domestic rm
are on average less well paid (-.9%) before they move.
As mentioned above, we also consider dierent versions of equation 1. First, we allow for
rm unobserved heterogeneity by including rm xed eects (j) in that equation:
wit = 1FDit + 2DFit + 3DDit + 4FFit + X0
it5 + F0
it6 + j + 
t + it: (6)
This model allows for systematic dierences across dierent categories of movers in terms
of the wage policies of their rms. For instance, movers from domestic to foreign rms may
tend to be employed in low-wage domestic rms. In that case, the domestic-to-foreign dummy
variable coecient may be spuriously high if no controls for rm-specic heterogeneity are
included.
Moreover, specication (6) is also attractive as it can be interpreted as presenting within-
7rm evidence about the dierences of each type of mover with respect to their colleagues
at the same rm. In other words, we can compare the wages of each type of `mover-to-be'
(domestic to domestic or domestic to foreign, for instance) with the wages of their colleagues
that will stay at the same rms. For the benet of robustness, we also consider extended
versions of the model in equation (6) by considering rm-year dummies (j  
t), instead of
including separately rm and year dummies (j + 
t).
Our results, presented in columns B and C of Table 2 are consistent with the ndings
without controls for rm unobserved heterogeneity reported in column A. We nd that workers
that will move to foreign rms (regardless of being employed in domestic or foreign rms) are
already receiving signicantly higher wages even before they move, even when compared to
their colleagues in the same rm or in the same rm-year. Movers from domestic to foreign
rms earn about 0.8% more than stayers, while movers from foreign to other foreign rms
earn about 1.7% to 2.2% more. On the other hand, movers from foreign to domestic rms
again do not earn statistically dierent wages than their colleagues at foreign rms.
Finally, we examine longitudinal variation in each workers' wage, by including worker-
specic xed eects (i) and allowing for worker time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity:
wit = 1DFit + 2FDit + 3DDit + 4DDit + X0
it5 + F0
it6 + i + 
t + it: (7)
This specication provides evidence about possible dierences in the path of wages for
workers that change their rm, as the 1, 2, 3 and 4 coecients are identied from rm
switchers. It is important to underline that the mobility dummies (DFit, FDit, etc) refer
to the employment spell that predates the movement between rms. This implies that the
interpretation of the results is symmetrical to the more common case of dummy variables
that are switched on after some occurrence. In other words, in our specication, a negative
coecient for a type of worker that moves, for instance, from a foreign to a domestic rm
should be interpreted as an increase in wages as the worker is employed by the domestic rm.
Moreover, for the benet of robustness, we consider rst a version of equation (7) without
rm controls (Fit) - see column D. Such specication has the advantage of not partialling out
any dierences in wages that may result from workers moving, say, from `high-wage' to `low-
wage' rms. If such dierences in rm attributes are driven by compensating dierentials,
then it will be appropriate to control for their role in wages. However, if those dierences
8are instead created by non-competitive forces (e.g. rent sharing), then one should not control
for them.11 By presenting the results from both approaches (rst without and then with
rm-level control variables), we instead obtain what can be argued to be lower and upward
bounds of the wage eects of dierent types of mobility between rms.
The last two columns of Table 2 indicate that all mover dummy estimates are negative.
However, one should also take into account that movers between foreign and domestic rms
will gain or lose the wage premium associated to foreign ownership. This means that while
domestic-to-foreign movers gain a total average wage increase of approximately 18% (9:5%+
8:5%) - see column D -, movers in the opposite direction have an average wage change of
-8.4% (0:08%   8:5%). On the other hand, movers from one domestic rm to another or
from one foreign rm to another gain respectively 4.8% and 4.1% as they switch rms of the
same ownership type. Moreover, we nd that the results are attenuated when controlling for
rm characteristics, but not in to a very large extent. In this specication (see column E),
movers from foreign to domestic rms take a pay cut of 3.2% (1:1%   4:3%), while movers
from domestic to foreign rms gain a pay increase of 10.2% (5:9% + 4:3%). Movers between
domestic (foreign) rms gain a wage increase of 3.1% (3.4%).
According to the discussion above, these ndings are important evidence of more generous
wage policies oered by foreign rms. On average, workers that move from a domestic to a
foreign rm are more qualied (in terms of their wage residuals) than those that do not move
at all from their domestic rms - a result that supports the existence of a `selection eect'.
However, when such workers switch to a foreign rm, they receive a very considerable pay
increase. This nding supports the case that, on top of the selection eect, there is also a
`wage policy eect'. The latter result also suggests that a large number of such workers move
voluntarily.
On the other hand, the wages of movers from foreign to domestic rms present very
dierent characteristics. First, they tend to be (marginally) less well paid in the foreign
rms from which they leave, either in a standard cross-section analysis or when comparing
those movers-to-be with their colleagues. Second, movers from foreign to domestic rms take
a considerable wage cut upon mobility. The contrast in the results for domestic-to-foreign
and foreign-to-domestic movers give further support to the view that foreign rms oer more
11For instance, if the positive relationship between rm size and wages is driven by rent sharing, then when
controlling for rm size, the domestic-to-foreign mobility coecient would wrongly fail to pick up the wage
increase related to rent sharing.
9generous wage policies.
3.2 Wage growth
One concern about the results presented above is that they may mask a trade-o between
wage levels and wage growth. For instance, workers may accept lower starting wages (as they
seem to do when moving from foreign to domestic rms) in exchange of steeper wage proles
at their new rms (Pakes & Nitzan 1983).
We test this hypothesis by estimating wage growth equations that allow for dierent wage
growth levels depending on the type of between-rm mobility. We essentially adopt the wage
equations described above (particularly the specications presented in columns A and B of
Table 2) but considering wage growth instead as the dependent variable:
wit+1 = 1DFit + 2FDit + 3DDit + 4DDit + X0
it5 + F0
it6 + 
t + it; (8)
in which wit+1 = wit+1   wit is the wage growth of worker i between years t + 1 and t.
As before, we also consider models with rm xed eects (j), in order to allow for rm-
specic wage growth patterns:
wit+1 = 1DFit + 2FDit + 3DDit + 4DDit + X0
it5 + F0
it6 + j + 
t + it: (9)
Moreover, we also compute wage growth over dierent periods: between the second year in
which the worker is in the `new' rm (domestic or foreign, depending on the specic mobility
path) and the rst year at that rm, between the third and the second year, and between
the fourth and the third year (t + 2, t + 3 or t + 4). The comparison group for each analysis
corresponds to a 25% sample of all workers that have also stayed on in their rms for at least
two, three or four years (depending on whether the wage growth is being measured at t + 2,
t + 3 or t + 4), but that have not moved between rms over the period.
Our results, presented in Table 3, systematically indicate evidence of higher wage growth
for workers that move from domestic to foreign rms than for workers that move from foreign
to domestic rms. For instance, in column A we nd that the former experience average wage
growth of 4.6%, while for the latter average wage growth is only 2.5%. Very similar results
are obtained for the specication with rm xed eects and for wage growth comparisons over
10the third or fourth years, although the gaps in wage growth tend to fall with time.12
It is also interesting to notice that the inclusion of rm xed eects in these wage grwoth
equations dramatically increases the t of the model, suggesting that there are very clear
dierences in wage proles across rms. However, the coecients of the mobility dummies
hardly change when such xed eects are introduced.
In conclusion, we nd that the dierences between the two main types of movers obtained
from the initial analysis in Subsection 3.1 are actually strengthened, not weakened, when we
consider wage growth patterns. Movers from domestic to foreign rms benet not only from
higher wage increases upon switching rms but also sustained higher wage growth levels after
that, at least over the second and third years at their new rms.
3.3 Displacement
As mentioned before, this paper seeks to provide evidence about the impact of dierent types
of mobility. This goal may not be rigorously achieved with observational data as ours, even
when considering our extensive set of control variables. Intuitively, the wages earned by
workers that do not move between rms may not provide an appropriate counterfactual for
the wages of workers that move (if they had not moved). So, for instance, while we nd that
workers that move from domestic to foreign rms experience a very large wage increase with
respect to workers that do not move, the former group of workers would perhaps also have
experienced a large wage increase if they had stayed at their original domestic rm. In this
case, the eect of the domestic-to-foreign mobility type would be overestimated.
In order to provide complementary evidence that may be less aected by the endogeneity
of interrm mobility, we conduct an analysis based on displaced workers (Jacobson et al.
1993). The displaced workers we consider are derived from two groups. The rst group are
those workers that leave rms that undergo mass layos, dened as a net job creation rate
of -40% or less, provided the rm employs that year at least 20 workers. The second group
of displaced workers are those who are employed in rms that go bankrupt, dened as rms
whose identiers stop appearing in the data.13 Given the motivation of our analysis, all
12For instance, column F of Table 3 indicates that there are virtually no dierences in wage growth between
workers that moved from foreign to domestic rms or from domestic to foreign rms when they reach their
fourth year in their new rms. However, in the fourth year, there may be important selection issues, as the
sample drops to almost one third of its original size in the second year.
13Strictly speaking, this second group is a subset of the rst. See footnote 8 for our denition of the net job
creation rate. Very ocasionally, data for (smaller) rms exhibit gaps in some years. We conduct our analysis
11displaced workers are required to be observed again in the data in years t + 1 or t + 2.
We also consider a sample of 25% of all workers that have never switched rms (our `con-
trol' group). All movers between rms that have moved outside the context of a displacement
(as dened above) are dropped from our sample. Table 13 presents some descriptive statistics
of the sample of displaced workers. These correspond to approximately 183,000 observations
or about 18.6% of all movers. Amongst other results, we nd a large percentage of industry
switchers (46.3%), which is, however, smaller than in the set of all movers. It is also inter-
esting to notice that there is a greater share of domestic-to-foreign movers in the displaced
sample than in the set of all movers.
We nd that our earlier results based on all workers hold in the displaced movers subsam-
ple - see Table 4. For instance, across specications A, B and C, we nd that displaced movers
from domestic to foreign rms are systematically better paid (at the domestic rms) com-
pared to workers that do not move to foreign rms (a signicant premium ranging from 1.7%
to 4.9%). However, displaced workers that move from foreign to domestic rms earn lower
wages than their colleagues at the foreign rms. In this case, we nd a negative and signi-
cant premium ranging from -3.8% to -7.6%, except when not considering rm heterogeneity,
when the premium is insignicant. Recall that all such foreign-to-domestic coecients were
signicant when considering the entire sample (Table 2).
Moreover, displaced movers from foreign to domestic rms also undergo considerable pay
cuts, from -7.7% ( 2:1% 5:6%) to -5.6% ( 2:6% 3%). On the other hand, displaced movers
from domestic to foreign rms do still enjoy a considerable increase in their pay, from 14.5%
(8:9% + 5:6%) to 5.8% (2:8% + 3%).
Overall, these ndings reinforce the earlier results on the dierent patterns of wages across
dierent types of movers. Workers that move from foreign to domestic rms are paid less (or,
at least, not more) than their colleagues before they move (the `selection eect'). On top of
that, these workers subsequently take pay cuts when they move (the `wage policy eect'). On
the other hand, workers that move from domestic to foreign rms are already paid more than
their colleagues. These displaced movers from domestic to foreign rms then go on to earn
considerable pay increases at their new rms.
making sure these gaps are not regarded as displacements.
124 Robustness
In this Section, we consider the robustness of our results to dierent subsamples of our data set.
We start by considering the specic case of `high-skill' industries. Our motivation is twofold:
First, `high-skill' industries are more prevalent in developed countries. The analysis of such
industries may therefore shed light on the international dierences regarding the evidence on
the foreign-rm wage dierential mentioned above (Heyman et al. 2007, Andrews et al. 2007,
Martins & Esteves 2008).
A second aspect, although related to the rst, is that one may argue that there is less
scope for large wage discrepancies between domestic and foreign rms in `high-skill' industries
than in `low-skill' industries. In fact, the latter type of industries may allow for greater scope
in terms of wage dispersion between rms and, in particular, between domestic and foreign
rms, given the low wages typically paid there, especially when compared to the wages for
similar jobs in the home country of the foreign rms.
Finally, we examine wage dierences for the entire data set but adopting the point of
view of dierences and changes in wages after the spell of mobility, again for dierent types
of mobility. This allows us to assess the wage increases upon mobility when controlling for
the characteristics of the hiring rm (in our benchmark results we controlled instead for the
characteristics of the rm the worker was leaving). Moreover, this approach also allow us to
investigate the `ranking' of the new workers in terms of their colleagues at the hiring rms.
4.1 High-skill industries
Our analysis of high-skill industries by selecting only industries which exhibit particularly high
levels of worker tenure. In particular, we construct our sample by considering the average
tenure of all workers in each rm and in each year. We then calculate the mean of that average
tenure per rm-year across all rms in each industry over the ten years in our sample. Finally,
we select only rms in industries whose average tenure is in the top third of the distribution
of tenure across all rms.
The results, in Table 5, are similar to the main results from Section 3. Foreign-to-domestic
rm movers are not positively selected and take large pay cuts upon moving. On the other
hand, domestic-to-foreign movers tend to be positively selected and gain considerable wage
increases.
13An alternative measure of skill we consider is schooling. In this case, we construct our
subsample similarly to the case of tenure, by considering average schooling within and across
rms and selecting only rms in industries whose average schooling is in the top third of the
distribution of schooling across all rms.
The results are presented in Table 6. Again, the ndings are consistent with the earlier
analysis, namely that there is a negative `selection eect' regarding the workers in foreign
rms that are hired by domestic rms, although the nding is reverted in the analysis within
each rm. Moreover, while such movers do still take pay cuts at domestic rms, it is noticeable
that the magnitude of these pay cuts is considerably smaller than in previous analysis. On
the other hand, we still nd the same pattern as to the wage level and wage growth dierences
for workers that move from domestic to foreign rms.
A nal alternative measure of worker skill we consider are the wages earned by workers.
We replicate the previous analysis considering now only rms from industries at the top third
of the wage distribution across the entire economy. In other words, we select only rms in
industries whose average wage is in the top third of the wage distribution across all rms.
Table 7 presents the results, which are similar to those from high-schooling industries.
There is some evidence of positive selection of movers from foreign to domestic rms although
such workers do still take pay cuts as they move, except if one controls for the dierent
characteristics of the two employers (column E). Moreover, as in all other analysis, movers
from domestic to foreign rms are positively selected and see their wages increase considerably
at their new employers.
Overall, our results lend further strength to the main results from Section 3, especially
in terms of the positive `selection' and `wage policy' eects concerning movers from domestic
to foreign rms. However, the evidence concerning movers from foreign to domestic rms for
some denitions of `high-skill' industries presents some dierences, as the wage cuts for those
workers tend to be smaller and there is some evidence of positive selection.
As mentioned above, this dierence between the main results and those regarding `high-
skill' industries may help one reconcile the contrasting results about the role of foreign rms in
developed and developing economies in research using worker-level longitudinal data (Heyman
et al. 2007, Andrews et al. 2007, Martins & Esteves 2008). The rst two papers, covering
the case of Sweden and Germany, respectively, nd little evidence of wage dierences between
14foreign and domestic rms, unlike in the case of the third paper, who considers the case of
Brazil. To the extent that, in developing economies, foreign rms are more likely to be located
in `low-skills' industries, then the scope for foreign rms to pay higher wages is greater. Our
results, comparing dierent sectors of the same economy, are consistent with that hypothesis.
4.2 `After-mobility' analysis
In our nal robustness analysis, we re-examine our earlier, benchmark results from the point
of view of the rm to which a worker moves to, rather than from the point of view of the
rm from which a worker leaves. This complementary perspective on the wage consequences
of interrm worker mobility serves two purposes. The rst is to conrm the size of the wage
changes following a movement to a dierent rm. This is important as at least part of the large
wage increases documented for movers from domestic to foreign rms (and vice-versa) could
be driven by the characteristics of foreign rms, particularly those that hire those movers.
The second purpose of this analysis is to contrast the `selection eects' before and after the
worker moves between rms.
We conduct our analysis by estimating the following equation:
wit = 1FDit + 2DFit + 3DDit + 4FFit + X0
it5 + F0
it6 + 
t + it; (10)
in which wit represents the logarithm of the average real wage of worker i in year t, X
are worker controls (schooling, quadratics in tenure and experience, and gender), F are rm
controls (log rm size - measured by the number of workers, industry and region dummies,
and a foreign-rm dummy) that now concern the rm to which the worker moves, and 
t are
year xed eects.
The mobility dummies are dened in a similar way than before, except that, as mentioned





1; if Fori;s 1 = 1 and Foris = 0
0; if Fori;s 1 = 0 or Foris = 1;
(11)
in which s is the worker-rm spell, as dened above.
The results from dierent specications based on equation 10 are presented in Table 8. The
15results suggest a very strong `selection eect' as regards to movers from foreign to domestic
rms. These workers tend to be very generously placed along the wage distribution of their
rms, as the premium ranges between 4.6% and 12.8% (columns A to C). On the other hand,
movers from domestic to foreign rms are, on average, slightly below similar workers pay
levels (a negative premium of between -1.2% and -.5%). Movers between domestic or between
foreign rms tend to be relatively well rewarded, particularly the latter.
With respect to wage growth, our evidence from Table 8 is very consistent with earlier
ndings. Wage growth of movers from foreign to domestic rms is negative, particularly when
not controlling for rm characteristics (columns D and E). On the other hand, movers from
domestic to foreign rms experience massive wage increases (from 18.9% to 10.7%). Movers
between domestic or between foreign rms also experience wage gains, particularly the latter.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides comprehensive empirical evidence about the wage consequences of worker
mobility between domestic and foreign rms. Using detailed matched employer-employee
panel data from Portugal (covering both the manufacturing and services sectors), we trace
virtually all spells of inter-rm worker mobility in the country over a period of ten years
(1991-2000).
Our results indicate that movements from domestic to foreign rms translate into consid-
erable and robust average pay increases, of more than 10% in many cases. This pay increase
is consistent with a `wage policy eect' - greater `generosity' in the remuneration practices
of foreign rms vis- a-vis their domestic counterparts. On the other hand, there is also a `se-
lection eect', although typically much smaller. This latter eect arises as foreign rms hire
workers that are, on average, already better remunerated in their domestic rms than `sim-
ilar' workers, even when conducting such comparison within each worker's rm. Moreover,
our results for domestic rms are largely symmetric to those for foreign rms. For instance,
movers from foreign to domestic rms earn, on average, a large pay cut when they move, a
nding that lends further support to the `wage policy' eect documented above.
Our results also prove to be very robust across dierent specications and samples. This
is particularly the case for the subset of displaced workers, whose mobility can be argued
to be less subject to endogeneity concerns. However, we nd that both the `wage policy'
16and the `selection' eects are somewhat weaker in the specic case of mobility of workers
from foreign to domestic rms in some `high-skill' sectors. This result may help explain
the apparent negative relationship between the foreign-rm wage premium and economic
development (Heyman et al. 2007, Andrews et al. 2007, Martins & Esteves 2008) to the
extent that high-skill sectors are more prevalent in developed economies.
Overall, our ndings for the `wage policy' and `selection' eects can be easily reconciled.
Foreign rms can attract the `best' workers as they oer them large wage increases. Such
wage increases will presumably more than compensate for the costs involved in the mobility
process and increase welfare in the host country.
Our results may also inform the debate about the productivity spillovers of foreign rms
(Javorcik 2004) and, specically, the role of worker mobility in those spillovers (Fosfuri et al.
2001). Indeed, we nd that domestic rms tend to hire `below-average' workers from foreign
rms who take, on average, pay cuts (which is consistent with involuntary mobility). These
results suggest that worker mobility is unlikely to be a major source of productivity spillovers
from foreign to domestic rms. In fact, our ndings, including the result that foreign rms
attract some of the `best' workers in domestic rms, may suggest that, if any, productivity
spillovers from worker mobility occur from domestic to foreign rms.
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Figure 1: Foreign Direct Investment in Portugal, 1986-2001
Source: Bank of Portugal.
19Table 1: Descriptive statistics - all workers
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N
Log hourly pay 1.383 (0.612) 10419465
Schooling 6.892 (3.689) 11302053
Female 0.39 (0.488) 11552228
Tenure 8.705 (8.599) 11552228
Experience 23.892 (12.318) 11302053
Foreign rm 0.078 (0.268) 11552228
For-to-Dom 0.005 (0.069) 11552228
Dom-to-For 0.006 (0.076) 11552228
Dom-to-Dom 0.074 (0.261) 11552228
For-to-For 0.001 (0.035) 11552228
Log rm size 4.469 (2.316) 11552228
Net job creation rate 0.037 (0.259) 10697558
Notes: `Foreign' is a dummy taking value one if the rm-year is foreign owned (and value zero otherwise).
`Dom-to-For' is a dummy taking value one if the worker moves in that period from a domestic rm to a foreign
rm (and value zero otherwise) - i.e. if in the next period the worker will be at a foreign rm. `Dom-to-Dom' is
a dummy taking value one if the worker moves from a domestic rm to another domestic rm (and value zero
otherwise). `For-to-Dom' is a dummy taking value one if the worker moves from a foreign rm to a domestic
rm (and value zero otherwise). `For-to-For' is a dummy taking value one if the worker moves from a foreign
rm to another foreign rm (and value zero otherwise).
20Table 2: Wage equations - all workers
A B C D E
Foreign rm .136 -.002 .085 .043
(.001) (.002) (.001) (.001)
For-to-Dom .002 -.004 -.002 -.0008 -.011
(.003) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Dom-to-For .023 .008 .008 -.095 -.059
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Dom-to-Dom -.009 .005 .007 -.048 -.031
(.0006) (.0006) (.0007) (.0006) (.0006)
For-to-For .071 .017 .022 -.041 -.034
(.005) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.003)
Worker controls x x x x x
Firm controls x x x x
Worker xed eects x x
Firm xed eects x
Firm-year xed eects x
Obs. 4285462 4285467 4285467 4285467 4285462
R2 .579 .713 .77 .874 .879
Notes: Dependent variable: log real hourly wage. Worker-level controls are schooling, experience and its
square, tenure and its square, and a female dummy variable. Firm-level controls are region and industry
dummies and rm size. `Foreign rm' is a dummy taking value one if the rm-year is foreign owned (and value
zero otherwise). `Dom-to-For' is a dummy taking value one for workers that are in the current employment
spell at a domestic rm and will in the next employment spell be at a foreign rm (and value zero otherwise).
`For-to-For' is a dummy taking value one for workers that are in the current employment spell at a foreign rm
and will in the next employment spell be at a foreign rm (and value zero otherwise). `For-to-Dom' is a dummy
taking value one for workers that are in the current employment spell at a foreign rm and will in the next
employment spell be at a domestic rm (and value zero otherwise). `Dom-to-Dom' is a dummy taking value
one for workers that are in the current employment spell at a domestic rm and will in the next employment
spell be at a dierent domestic rm (and value zero otherwise). `For-to-For' is a dummy taking value one for
workers that are in the current employment spell at a foreign rm and will in the next employment spell be at
a dierent foreign rm (and value zero otherwise). All specications include year dummies. Robust standard
errors, clustered at the worker level. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
21Table 3: Wage growth equations - only workers that stay in t + 2, t + 3 or t + 4 in
same rm as in t + 1
Wage growth in: t + 2 t + 3 t + 4
A B C D E F
Foreign rm .002 .0002 .003 .018 -.002 -.015
(.001) (.003) (.001) (.004) (.002) (.005)
For-to-Dom .025 .020 .007 .008 .005 .005
(.003) (.004) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.005)
Dom-to-For .046 .046 .021 .022 .014 .018
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.004)
Dom-to-Dom .014 .015 .009 .009 .005 .008
(.0008) (.001) (.0009) (.001) (.001) (.002)
For-to-For .042 .040 .030 .029 .009 .004
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.007) (.007) (.009)
Worker controls x x x x x x
Firm controls x x x x x x
Firm xed eects x x x
Obs. 1343810 1343813 839529 839532 552900 552902
R2 .007 .119 .005 .153 .005 .186
Notes: Dependent variable: growth of the real hourly wage. Worker-level controls are schooling, experience
and its square, tenure and its square, and a female dummy variable. Firm-level controls are region and industry
dummies and rm size. `Foreign rm' is a dummy taking value one if the rm-year is foreign owned (and value
zero otherwise). `Dom-to-For' is a dummy taking value one for workers that are in the current employment
spell at a domestic rm and will in the next employment spell be at a foreign rm (and value zero otherwise).
See notes to table 2 for descriptions of remaining variables. All specications include year dummies. Robust
standard errors, clustered at the worker level. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
22Table 4: Wage equations - only movers included are those displaced
A B C D E
Foreign rm .140 .0001 .056 .030
(.001) (.002) (.002) (.002)
For-to-Dom .009 -.038 -.076 .021 .026
(.008) (.008) (.015) (.005) (.005)
Dom-to-For .049 .017 .031 -.089 -.028
(.006) (.006) (.008) (.004) (.004)
Dom-to-Dom -.0003 .013 .022 -.028 -.008
(.001) (.002) (.005) (.001) (.001)
For-to-For .062 -.003 -.045 -.019 .006
(.016) (.015) (.021) (.009) (.009)
Worker controls x x x x x
Firm controls x x x x
Worker xed eects x x
Firm xed eects x
Firm-year xed eects x
Obs. 2260710 2260713 2260713 2260713 2260710
R2 .621 .752 .809 .933 .934
Notes: `Displaced movers' are those that left rms that leave the data or that left rms that were undergoing
major downsizing (see more details in the main text). Dependent variable: log real hourly wage. Worker-
level controls are schooling, experience and its square, tenure and its square, and a female dummy variable.
Firm-level controls are region and industry dummies and rm size. `Foreign rm' is a dummy taking value one
if the rm-year is foreign owned (and value zero otherwise). `Dom-to-For' is a dummy taking value one for
workers that are in the current employment spell at a domestic rm and will in the next employment spell be
at a foreign rm (and value zero otherwise). See notes to table 2 for descriptions of remaining variables. All
specications include year dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered at the worker level. Signicance levels:
*: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
23Table 5: Wage equations - only workers from `high-tenure' industries
A B C D E
Foreign rm .147 .006 .081 .045
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
For-to-Dom .006 -.001 -.002 .002 -.008
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Dom-to-For .015 .007 .006 -.123 -.077
(.002) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.002)
Dom-to-Dom -.016 .006 .009 -.061 -.041
(.0008) (.0009) (.001) (.0009) (.0009)
For-to-For .036 .008 .010 -.043 -.034
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.004)
Worker controls x x x x x
Firm controls x x x x
Worker xed eects x x
Firm xed eects x
Firm-year xed eects x
Obs. 2439091 2439093 2439093 2439093 2439091
R2 .608 .722 .777 .895 .899
Notes: `High-tenure' industries dened as those at the top third of the tenure distribution. Dependent variable:
log real hourly wage. Worker-level controls are schooling, experience and its square, tenure and its square, and
a female dummy variable. Firm-level controls are region and industry dummies and rm size. `Foreign rm'
is a dummy taking value one if the rm-year is foreign owned (and value zero otherwise). `Dom-to-For' is a
dummy taking value one for workers that are in the current employment spell at a domestic rm and will in the
next employment spell be at a foreign rm (and value zero otherwise). See notes to table 2 for descriptions of
remaining variables. All specications include year dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered at the worker
level. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
24Table 6: Wage equations - only workers from `high-skill' industries
A B C D E
Foreign rm .167 -.003 .063 .041
(.002) (.003) (.002) (.002)
For-to-Dom -.017 .008 .007 -.027 -.037
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.003) (.003)
Dom-to-For .021 .013 .011 -.117 -.090
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Dom-to-Dom -.025 .009 .011 -.082 -.060
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
For-to-For .057 .024 .028 -.053 -.050
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.004) (.004)
Worker controls x x x x x
Firm controls x x x x
Worker xed eects x x
Firm xed eects x
Firm-year xed eects x
Obs. 1534477 1534482 1534482 1534482 1534477
R2 .581 .722 .776 .903 .906
Notes: `High-skill' industries dened as those at the top third of the schooling distribution. Dependent
variable: log real hourly wage. Worker-level controls are schooling, experience and its square, tenure and its
square, and a female dummy variable. Firm-level controls are region and industry dummies and rm size.
`Foreign rm' is a dummy taking value one if the rm-year is foreign owned (and value zero otherwise). `Dom-
to-For' is a dummy taking value one for workers that are in the current employment spell at a domestic rm
and will in the next employment spell be at a foreign rm (and value zero otherwise). See notes to table 2 for
descriptions of remaining variables. All specications include year dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered
at the worker level. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
25Table 7: Wage equations - only workers from `high-wage' industries
A B C D E
Foreign rm .146 -.001 .063 .035
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
For-to-Dom -.004 .007 .008 -.032 -.033
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Dom-to-For .014 .012 .011 -.137 -.089
(.002) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.002)
Dom-to-Dom -.026 .008 .011 -.091 -.061
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
For-to-For .062 .024 .030 -.056 -.044
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.004) (.004)
Worker controls x x x x x
Firm controls x x x x
Worker xed eects x x
Firm xed eects x
Firm-year xed eects x
Obs. 1915256 1915261 1915261 1915261 1915256
R2 .559 .706 .761 .89 .894
Notes: `High-wage' industries dened as those at the top third of the wage distribution. Dependent variable:
log real hourly wage. Worker-level controls are schooling, experience and its square, tenure and its square, and
a female dummy variable. Firm-level controls are region and industry dummies and rm size. `Foreign rm'
is a dummy taking value one if the rm-year is foreign owned (and value zero otherwise). `Dom-to-For' is a
dummy taking value one for workers that are in the current employment spell at a domestic rm and will in the
next employment spell be at a foreign rm (and value zero otherwise). See notes to table 2 for descriptions of
remaining variables. All specications include year dummies. Robust standard errors, clustered at the worker
level. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
26Table 8: Wage equations - all workers, variables measured `after' moving to new
rm
A B C D E
Foreign rm .157 -.009 .100 .054
(.001) (.003) (.002) (.002)
FD .128 .052 .046 .039 .042
(.002) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.002)
DF -.005 -.015 -.012 .089 .053
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
DD .047 .016 .013 .040 .037
(.0007) (.0007) (.0008) (.0007) (.0007)
FF .125 .064 .062 .066 .053
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.003) (.003)
Worker controls x x x x x
Firm controls x x x x
Worker xed eects x x
Firm xed eects x
Firm-year xed eects x
Obs. 4183008 4183009 4183009 4183009 4183008
R2 .562 .704 .764 .88 .884
Notes: Dependent variable: log real hourly wage. Worker-level controls are schooling, experience and its
square, tenure and its square, and a female dummy variable. Firm-level controls are region and industry
dummies and rm size. `Foreign rm' is a dummy taking value one if the rm-year is foreign owned (and value
zero otherwise). `Dom-to-For' is a dummy taking value one for workers that are in the current employment
spell at a domestic rm and will in the next employment spell be at a foreign rm (and value zero otherwise).
See notes to table 2 for descriptions of remaining variables. All specications include year dummies. Robust
standard errors, clustered at the worker level. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
27Table 9: Descriptive statistics - all workers moving from foreign to domestic rms,
while at foreign rm
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N
Log hourly pay 1.573 (0.664) 51434
Wage growth -0.063 (0.551) 48085
Schooling 8.734 (4.103) 52954
Female 0.398 (0.49) 54565
Tenure 2.89 (4.284) 54565
Experience 15.173 (9.743) 52954
Foreign rm 1 (0) 54565
Log rm size 5.769 (1.709) 54565
Net job creation rate 0.12 (0.383) 51058
Industry switcher 0.668 (0.471) 54564
Year gap 1.28 (0.449) 54565
1992 0.071 (0.257) 54565
1993 0.1 (0.3) 54565
1994 0.075 (0.264) 54565
1995 0.099 (0.298) 54565
1996 0.107 (0.309) 54565
1997 0.144 (0.351) 54565
1998 0.167 (0.373) 54565
1999 0.14 (0.347) 54565
Notes: See description of variables in notes to Table 1. `Wage growth' denotes the dierence in the logarithm
of the hourly wage between years t + 1 and t. `Industry switcher' is a dummy variable taking value one if
the worker is in a dierent two-digit industry in year t + 1 when compared to year t. `Year gap' is the year
dierence between the two years over which the worker moves between rms (by design, this is between one
and two).
28Table 10: Descriptive statistics - all workers moving from domestic to foreign rms,
while at domestic rm
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N
Log hourly pay 1.334 (0.642) 61811
Wage growth 0.217 (0.526) 59583
Schooling 8.314 (3.961) 64371
Female 0.442 (0.497) 66609
Tenure 2.8 (4.413) 66609
Experience 14.592 (9.638) 64371
Foreign rm 0 (0) 66609
Log rm size 4.437 (2.079) 66609
Net job creation rate 0.099 (0.386) 59346
Industry switcher 0.684 (0.465) 66607
Year gap 1.252 (0.434) 66609
1992 0.097 (0.296) 66609
1993 0.114 (0.317) 66609
1994 0.085 (0.279) 66609
1995 0.091 (0.288) 66609
1996 0.099 (0.299) 66609
1997 0.124 (0.33) 66609
1998 0.148 (0.355) 66609
1999 0.166 (0.372) 66609
Notes: See description of variables in notes to Tables 1 and 9.
Table 11: Descriptive statistics - all workers moving between domestic rms, while
at rst domestic rm
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N
Log hourly pay 1.174 (0.55) 776666
Wage growth 0.064 (0.507) 726018
Schooling 6.821 (3.471) 821424
Female 0.368 (0.482) 849294
Tenure 3.132 (4.494) 849294
Experience 17.871 (10.747) 821424
Foreign rm 0 (0) 849294
Log rm size 3.656 (1.934) 849294
Net job creation rate 0.072 (0.368) 744665
Industry switcher 0.529 (0.499) 849293
Year gap 1.263 (0.44) 849294
1992 0.103 (0.304) 849294
1993 0.118 (0.323) 849294
1994 0.087 (0.282) 849294
1995 0.098 (0.297) 849294
1996 0.105 (0.306) 849294
1997 0.127 (0.333) 849294
1998 0.14 (0.347) 849294
1999 0.124 (0.329) 849294
Notes: See description of variables in notes to Tables 1 and 9.
29Table 12: Descriptive statistics - all workers moving between foreign rms, while
at rst foreign rm
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N
Log hourly pay 1.741 (0.702) 13588
Wage growth 0.058 (0.529) 13238
Schooling 9.896 (4.189) 13838
Female 0.426 (0.495) 14232
Tenure 3.789 (5.579) 14232
Experience 14.086 (9.388) 13838
Foreign rm 1 (0) 14232
Log rm size 5.781 (1.74) 14232
Net job creation rate 0.116 (0.418) 13346
Industry switcher 0.576 (0.494) 14232
Year gap 1.281 (0.45) 14232
1992 0.062 (0.242) 14232
1993 0.093 (0.29) 14232
1994 0.067 (0.251) 14232
1995 0.096 (0.294) 14232
1996 0.116 (0.32) 14232
1997 0.192 (0.394) 14232
1998 0.166 (0.372) 14232
1999 0.141 (0.348) 14232
Notes: See description of variables in notes to Tables 1 and 9.
30Table 13: Descriptive statistics - only movers that are displaced
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N
Log hourly pay 1.157 (0.562) 163652
Wage growth 0.065 (0.493) 152025
Schooling 6.685 (3.432) 177144
Female 0.401 (0.49) 183638
Tenure 3.686 (5.059) 183638
Experience 19.29 (11.176) 177144
Foreign rm 0.048 (0.213) 183638
For-to-Dom 0.038 (0.192) 183638
Dom-to-For 0.056 (0.229) 183638
Dom-to-Dom 0.897 (0.304) 183638
For-to-For 0.009 (0.096) 183638
Log rm size 3.165 (1.956) 183638
Net job creation rate 0.024 (0.443) 149013
Industry switcher 0.463 (0.499) 183636
Year gap 1.269 (0.443) 183638
1992 0.099 (0.298) 183638
1993 0.157 (0.364) 183638
1994 0.082 (0.274) 183638
1995 0.097 (0.296) 183638
1996 0.099 (0.299) 183638
1997 0.119 (0.324) 183638
1998 0.131 (0.338) 183638
1999 0.136 (0.342) 183638
Notes: `Displaced movers' are those that left rms that leave the data or that left rms that were undergoing
major downsizing (net job creation of -40% or less). See description of variables in notes to Tables 1 and 9.
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